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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
  Amici are economists and economics professors who teach and write 
in the area of pharmaceutical regulation and health care policy, and who 
wish to ensure that the Court fully considers the adverse effects the 
institutional failures at the Food & Drug Administrative (“FDA”) have had 
on public health.  Amici have no stake in the outcome of this case.  They are 
filing this brief solely as individuals and not on behalf of the institutions 
with which they are affiliated. 
  John E. Calfee is a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise 
Institute.  He has written extensively on FDA policy, health care policy, and 
the pharmaceutical and drug markets.  Dr. Calfee is the author of many 
publications on pharmaceutical and health care issues.  See, e.g., John E. 
Calfee, PRICE, MARKETS, AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL REVOLUTION (2000).  
Dr. Calfee previously was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, and 
an associate professor at the Boston University School of Management. 
Daniel B. Klein is Professor of Economics at George Mason 
University and an Associate Fellow at the Ratio Institute in Stockholm, 
Sweden.  Professor Klein has published extensively on the ways that private, 
voluntary institutions respond to the natural demand for quality-and-safety 
assurance.  See, e.g., REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION   2 
OF GOOD CONDUCT (Daniel B. Klein, ed. 1997); Daniel B. Klein, Quality 
and Safety Assurance: How Voluntary Social Processes Remedy Their Own 
Shortcomings, INDEP. REV., Spring 1998, at 537; Daniel B. Klein & Alex 
Tabarrok, Who Certifies Off-Label?, REGULATION, Summer 2004, at 60; 
Daniel B. Klein, Consumer Protection, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS (forthcoming); Daniel B. Klein, Policy Medicine Versus Policy 
Quackery: Economists Against the FDA, KNOWLEDGE, TECHN. & POL’Y, 
Spring 2000, at 92; Daniel B. Klein & Alex Tabarrok, Is the FDA Safe and 
Effective?, available at www.FDAReview.org. 
Sam Peltzman is the Ralph and Dorothy Keller Distinguished Service 
Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Chicago Graduate 
School of Business.  He has written extensively on the economics of 
regulation and government activity, including the first empirical studies of 
the effects of Food and Drug Administration regulation.  See, e.g., Sam 
Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 
Drug Amendments, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1049 (1973); SAM PELTZMAN, 
REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE 1962 AMENDMENTS 
(1974).  The “Peltzman effect,” which arises when people adjust their 
behavior to a regulation in ways that counteract the intended effect of the 
regulation, is named after Professor Peltzman.   3 
  Alex Tabarrok is Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason 
University, research director for The Independent Institute and a Research 
Fellow with the Mercatus Center.  Professor Tabarrok has written 
extensively on health economics, including drug regulation by the FDA.  
See, e.g., Alex Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA via the Anomaly of Off-Label 
Drug Prescriptions, INDEP. REV., Summer 2000, at 25; Daniel B. Klein & 
Alex Taborrok, Time to End America’s Drug Lag, 85 CONSUMERS’ RES. 
MAG. 10 (2002); Daniel B. Klein & Alex Taborrok, Who Certifies Off-
Label?, REGULATION, Summer 2004, at 60. 
  Benjamin Zycher is a Senior Fellow at Manhattan Institute’s Center 
for Medical Progress.  Dr. Zycher is a former senior economist at the RAND 
Corporation, a former vice president for research at the Milken Institute, and 
a former member of the Board of Directors of the Western Economic 
Association International.  He is also a former adjunct professor of 
economics at the University of California, Los Angeles and the former editor 
of the quarterly public policy journal Jobs & Capital.  Dr. Zycher was a 
senior staff economist at the President’s Council of Economic Advisers 
during the first two years of the Reagan Administration.  Dr. Zycher’s 
research focuses on the economic and political effects of regulation.  He has   4 
done considerable work as well on health care policy and the economics of 
the pharmaceutical sector.  
  Amici take no position on the knotty constitutional questions of the 
due process clause that confront this Court, other than to note that the 
guidance of the Supreme Court has been opaque and inconsistent.  Compare 
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937 (2000) (unconstitutional to bar 
controversial medical procedure that is “necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation” of life or health because state must “tolerate 
responsible differences of medical opinion”) with Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 792 (1997) (“That many of the rights and 
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy 
does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, 
intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.”).  Cf. also Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 291 (2005).  Amici also take no 
position on the question of standing. 
  Rather, amici argue that the original panel’s decision, since vacated, 
presents no danger to public health and, in fact, would improve public health 
outcomes.  Empirical experience—both from the United States and abroad—
shows that the lengthy delays typically associated with FDA drug approvals 
do not demonstrably improve the public health outcomes.  Moreover,   5 
providing seriously-ill patients with access to potentially life-saving drugs 
after Phase 1 approval will not discourage further clinical testing.  Put 
simply, the decision of the original panel will enhance, rather than 
jeopardize, public health.  Therefore, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 29 and this Circuit’s Rule 29, amici respectfully request that the 
Court affirm the decision of the original panel. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
  This case concerns a systematic administrative breakdown that has for 
decades unnecessarily prevented terminally-ill patients from having access 
to drugs that have demonstrated a reasonable measure of safety and efficacy 
in FDA-approved trials.  The FDA’s long history of withholding clinically-
tested and potentially life-saving drugs from the market because of 
institutional failures renders any legal justification for these delays highly 
suspect.  In short, the legal question at the heart of this case is not whether 
Due Process requires the FDA to provide terminally-ill patients with access 
to unsafe drugs—by definition, the post-Phase 1drugs at issue here have 
already achieved a preliminary safety determination.  Rather, the question is 
whether the Court should permit the FDA to erect an administrative obstacle 
that, through delay, prevents useful drugs from reaching patients with no 
remaining treatment option.  It is this administrative failure—and not the   6 
discretion of the agency to determine the safety of new drugs in the first 
instance—that lies at the heart of this case.  
  Phase 1 trials traditionally focus on drug safety, including 
understanding the “metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the drug in 
humans, the side effects associated with increasing doses [and] the drug’s 
pharmacokinetics and pharmacological effects.”  21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a).  By 
contrast, Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials focus on drug effectiveness while 
gathering additional safety information.  Id. § 312.21(b) (“Phase 2 includes 
the controlled clinical studies conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
drug for a particular indication or indications in patients with the disease or 
condition under study.”); id. § 312.21(c) (Phase 3 trials “are intended to 
gather the additional information about effectiveness and safety that is 
needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship of the drug and to 
provide an adequate basis for physician labeling.”).  In oncology, however, 
Phase 1 trials typically reveal essential data on benefits as well as risks.  
Manish Agrawal & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Ethics of Phase 1 Oncology Studies: 
Reexamining the Arguments and Data, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1075 (2003).  
Preventing terminally-ill patients from pursuing potentially life-saving 
treatments until effectiveness has been thoroughly substantiated ignores the   7 
fact that for patients with no remaining treatment options, any significant, 
evidence-based chance of an effective outcome may be worth taking.   
  The FDA’s motivation for its unfounded delay in releasing safe drugs 
stems from an institutional desire to avoid potentially negative public 
opinion.  There are two types of errors that can be made in deciding whether 
to permit new drugs to be sold: erroneously identifying drugs as reasonably 
safe that are in fact unsafe, and refusing to permit the sale of drugs that are 
in fact reasonably safe.  These errors are known as Type I errors and Type II 
errors, respectively.  In arguing for reconsideration, the FDA suggested that 
releasing post-Phase 1-approved drugs to volunteers would risk exposing 
terminally-ill patients not only to inefficacious cancer treatments, but also to 
potentially unsafe side effects—a classic Type I error.  But the FDA’s 
institutional incentives to exercise excessive caution in approving new 
drugs, even if rational and well-informed patients would want access to such 
drugs, is not always consistent with patient welfare.  Empirical evidence 
strongly suggests that the FDA historically has been over-concerned with 
avoiding Type I errors while underestimating the damaging public health 
consequences of the Type II errors that affect patients such as the members 
of the Abigail Alliance.     8 
  Moreover, removing the administrative barriers that the FDA has 
erected between terminally-ill patients and potentially life-saving Phase 1-
approved drugs prescribed pursuant to medical professional judgment will 
not discourage further clinical testing of such drugs.  The widespread 
prescription of “off-label” drugs has not discouraged further testing of those 
drugs through random clinical trials while the drugs remained under patent 
protection.  Similarly, there is no reason to doubt that patients will continue 
to participate in randomized clinical trials for unapproved cancer drugs even 
if those drugs are made available outside of clinical trials, or that 
pharmaceutical research firms will continue to fund clinical trials for drugs 
that are already available to patients. 
Delaying drug approvals for years after the initial safety determination 
purely because of institutional risk aversion does not improve upon 
individual risk-benefit decisions or indeed advance public health writ large.  
The original panel decision did not undermine the process for scrutinizing 
investigational new drugs.  Nor did it compromise the robust incentives for 
patients to participate in post-Phase 1 trials or for manufacturers to fund 
such research.  It merely removed an indefensible administrative obstacle for 
a limited class of terminally-ill patients for whom there is no alternative 
treatment option.  If the more onerous provisions of FDA regulation were   9 
found unconstitutional, public health would be better off.  Whatever the 
merits of the FDA’s legal position, Abigail Alliance’s position redounds best 
to the public health.  
ARGUMENT 
I.  The Food & Drug Administration Has Historically Been Too Slow 
To Approve New Treatments. 
 
  Economists and others have long argued that FDA staff incentives are 
skewed toward excessive caution in the regulation of drug development and 
the approval of new drugs.  When deciding whether the benefits of a 
proposed new drug exceed its risks, FDA staff well know that if they 
commit a Type I error—the approval of a drug that turns out to be 
insufficiently safe once marketing begins—their error will become known.  
Because the harmful or deadly side-effects of the drug may be highly visible, 
a Type I error can and often does lead to impassioned criticism of the 
agency.  For example, the swine flu vaccine approved by the FDA in the 
mid-1970s proved effective at preventing influenza but resulted in hundreds 
of well-publicized cases of death or paralysis from Guillain-Barré syndrome.  
On the other hand, a Type II error—the failure to permit marketing of a drug 
that would in fact provide benefits in excess of harms—is typically detected 
only by the relatively few persons who are intimately involved in developing 
a drug with which patients and the larger medical community have no   10 
practical experience.  Yet the public health consequences of a failure to 
approve a beneficial drug may be even more severe than the approval of an 
insufficiently safe drug.  Type I errors are often quickly corrected precisely 
because insufficiently safe drugs cause public problems.  But the failure to 
approve a beneficial drug may go uncorrected for years.  As a result, the net 
effect of the asymmetry in publicity is to bias even the best-intentioned FDA 
regulators towards excessive caution and delay in approving new drugs.  
See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: 
The 1962 Drug Amendments, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1049 (1973), reprinted in 
CHICAGO STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 303-48 (George J. Stigler ed., 
University of Chicago Press 1988); SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE 1962 AMENDMENTS (1974); WILLIAM 
M. WARDELL AND LOUIS LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
(1975); Kenneth Kaitin & Jeffrey Brown, A Drug Lag Update, 29/2 DRUG 
INFO. J. 361-374 (1995); HENRY I. MILLER, TO AMERICA’S HEALTH: A 
PROPOSAL TO REFORM THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (2000).   
If the FDA’s overly cautious approach helped avoid the approval of 
unsafe drugs, one would expect more rapid drug approval timelines to result 
in a greater number of post-approval drug withdrawals.  But the facts are to 
the contrary.  For example, the United States, Spain and the U.K. have   11 
yielded essentially identical drug withdrawal rates despite the more rapid 
drug approval timelines in the European countries.  Olav M. Bakke, et al., 
Drug Safety Discontinuations in the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Spain from 1974 through 1993: A Regulatory Perspective, 58 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 108 (1995) (noting post-approval drug 
withdrawals of, respectively, 3% in U.S. and Spain, 4% in U.K.).  In 
addition, a recent Institute of Medicine report on drug safety and the FDA 
found no apparent diminution in drug safety resulting from faster new drug 
approvals since 1992.  INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG 
SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 3: 5-8 
(2006) (reviewing the effects of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 
1992).  In short, the FDA’s administrative delay in approving new drugs has 
produced few tangible reductions in new drug-related public health risks. 
  Recent debate over the FDA’s handling of drug safety, notably in 
connection with SSRI antidepressants and Vioxx, an arthritis pain reliever, 
and culminating in a recent report from the Institute of Medicine, has made 
clear that the institutional incentives to avoid Type I errors at the expense of 
committing more Type II errors remain very strong.  Criticism of FDA staff 
in connection with the safety of recently approved drugs vastly exceeds any 
criticism of agency sluggishness in approving the hundreds of drugs in   12 
development in recent years.  John E. Calfee, The Vioxx Fallout, AEI 
HEALTH POLICY OUTLOOK, Sept.-Oct. 2005; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE 
FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE 
PUBLIC (2006); John E. Calfee, Playing Catch-up: The FDA, Science, and 
Drug Regulation, AEI HEALTH POLICY OUTLOOK, March 2006. 
  Because of the strong institutional incentives to avoid Type I errors, it 
cannot be assumed that the FDA’s assessment of the relative risks and 
benefits of drugs during the development stage is correct or even unbiased.  
Rather, the FDA tends to be too conservative, often waiting far too long to 
release new drugs for marketing despite favorable results in Phase 1 trials.  
For example, a recent analysis of Phase 1 oncology drug trials, when drugs 
are still far from FDA approval, concluded that “the risks and benefits of 
Phase 1 trials are not clearly worse than risk-benefit ratios used by the US 
Food and Drug Administration to approve chemotherapeutic agents for 
clinical use.”  Manish Agrawal & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Ethics of Phase 1 
Oncology Studies: Reexamining the Arguments and Data, 290 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 1075 (2003).  Stated differently, seriously-ill patients who choose to 
voluntarily access Phase 1-approved drugs may face no greater treatment-
related risk than patients accessing those drugs after years of random clinical 
testing.   13 
  In addition to overstating potential risks, the FDA also systematically 
underestimates the potential benefits terminally-ill patients would gain from 
unapproved drugs that achieve favorable results in Phase 1 trials.  For many 
patients, such drugs present a window of opportunity that has been closed 
off by FDA regulation.  The disparity between patients’ assessment of risks 
and benefits, compared to the FDA’s, was detailed in a recent New England 
Journal of Medicine editorial on the risks and benefits of Phase 1 oncology 
drug trials:  “The intense lobbying efforts of activists for earlier access to 
experimental therapies for AIDS and breast cancer are further evidence that 
patients facing inevitable death may be less risk-averse than is the regulatory 
community.”  Razelle Kurzrock & Robert S. Benjamin, Editorial, Risks and 
Benefits of Phase 1 Oncology Trials, Revisited, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 930 
(2005).  Widespread patient acceptance of off-label prescribing, which 
accounts for the majority of oncology drug prescriptions, is further evidence 
that patients—particularly terminally-ill patients—are willing to accept risks 
involved in uses unapproved by the FDA. 
  In short, empirical evidence strongly suggests that the FDA’s drug 
approval process has not only failed to systematically improve the risk-
benefit profile of new drug approval, but may have harmed public health by 
unnecessarily delaying beneficial new treatments from the market.    14 
II.  Permitting Terminally-Ill Patients To Access Potentially Life-
Saving Post-Phase I Approval Drugs Will Not Discourage 
Participation In Randomized Clinical Trials. 
 
  Despite the dire warnings from the FDA in this litigation, there is no 
danger that the decision of the original panel will discourage broad patient 
participation in post-Phase 1 clinical trials.  In fact, experience shows that 
post-Phase 1 research proceeds even when the drugs being investigated are 
readily available.  For example, a long series of post-approval trials of the 
statin class of cholesterol-reducing drugs—currently among the most 
prescribed classes of drugs worldwide—has greatly expanded scientific 
knowledge of the role of serum cholesterol in heart attacks and strokes.  
Because these trials were often designed to demonstrate the ability of drugs 
to prevent relatively uncommon events, such as heart attacks among patients 
who are not at very high risk, many of these trials have been very large, 
involving tens of thousands of patients.  Eric Topol, Editorial, Intensive 
Statin Therapy: A Sea Change in Cardiovascular Prevention, 350 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1562 (2004).  Roughly half of the participants in these trials received 
arguably inferior alternative treatments even though the drugs being tested 
were already widely prescribed and were known to virtually all practicing 
physicians.  Patients were willing to enter these trials even after being   15 
informed of these circumstances and despite the availability of the drugs 
outside of trials. 
  In the universe of oncology treatment, post-approval trials are 
becoming standard practice.  Most new cancer drugs, such as Erbitux, 
Herceptin, Avastin, Gleevec, and Rituxan, are tightly targeted at precise 
biological mechanisms.  Often, the most efficient way to bring these drugs 
through the FDA approval process is to test them against a specific late-
stage cancer, such as metastatic breast cancer.  Success in such trials can 
bring fairly quick FDA approval, but research on broader uses for the 
treatment often continues after approval.  Such post-approval research 
typically explores earlier stages of the cancer (e.g., Herceptin), other cancers 
in which the same targeted biological mechanism is involved (such as 
Gleevec for gastrointestinal stromal tumors rather than its original indication 
for chronic myeloid leukemia), and even entirely different illnesses 
involving similar biological mechanisms.  For example, the cancer drug 
Avastin has been included trials for more than twenty different cancers or 
alternative treatment modalities (such as with or without older drugs).  
Michael Flanagan, Avastin’s Progression, BIOCENTURY, March 6, 2006, at 
A1.  And while originally approved for cancer treatment, the FDA recently 
approved Rituxan for rheumatoid arthritis treatment based on post-approval   16 
testing.  John E. Calfee & Elizabeth DuPré, The Emerging Market Dynamics 
of Targeted Therapeutics, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1302 (2006).  
  In most if not all of these post-approval trials, participants could have 
been prescribed the drug without entering into the trials.  The sheer number 
of patients involved in post-approval trials is evidence of the widespread 
willingness of patients to enroll in randomized trials of drugs that are readily 
available outside of clinical trials.   
III.  Affirming The Decision Of The Original Panel Will Not Reduce 
Incentives For Manufacturers To Conduct Randomized Clinical 
Trials Of Available Drugs. 
 
  The fact that patients readily enroll in clinical trials of approved drugs 
highlights the willingness of research firms to bear the significant expense of 
conducting such trials.  Manufacturers have strong market incentives to 
conduct post-approval trials that operate in addition to, or independently of, 
FDA regulation.  For example, post-approval trial results are sometimes 
used to obtain a Supplemental New Drug Approval (SNDA) from the FDA, 
thus expanding the range of FDA-approved uses for an approved drug.  This 
is by no means always the case, however, partly because FDA has 
historically been quite slow in reviewing supplemental indications.  Joseph 
A. DiMasi, Jeffrey S. Brown & Louis Lasagna, An Analysis of Regulatory 
Review Times of Supplemental Indications for Already-Approved Drugs:   17 
1989-1994, 30/2 DRUG INFO. J. 315 (1996).  Such research findings are 
among the many resources relied upon in off-label prescribing, an 
increasingly common practice in the field of oncology.  S. Thakkar, 
Oncologists Judge Themselves the Best Judges of Cancer Treatments, 16 J. 
NAT’L CANCER INST. 1188 (1997).  Indeed, off-label prescribing has been 
endorsed by FDA, the National Cancer Institute, and the American Society 
of Clinical Oncology, an organization of oncology practitioners and 
researchers.  See, e.g., More Information for Better Patient Care:  Hearings 
before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States 
Senate, 104th Congress, 64-73, 81-88 (Feb. 22, 1996) (testimony of William 
B. Schultz); NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, UNDERSTANDING THE APPROVAL 
PROCESS FOR NEW CANCER TREATMENTS (2004), available at 
http://newscenter.cancer.gov/clinicaltrials/ learning/approval-process-for-
cancer-drugs/allpages/print.  Oncology physicians, in particular, have 
vigorously defended off-label prescribing as redounding strongly to the 
benefit of patients.  American Society of Clinical Oncology, Reimbursement 
for Cancer Treatment: Coverage of Off-Label Drug Indications, J. CLINICAL 
ONCOLOGY, July 1, 2006, at 1.  The widespread phenomenon of off-label 
prescribing and the critical attention paid to the evidentiary support for such 
practices create strong incentives for manufacturers to conduct high-quality   18 
research on unapproved drugs that have passed Phase 1 trials.  Alex 
Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA via the Anomaly of Off-Label Drug 
Prescriptions, INDEP. REV., Summer 2000, at 25. 
  Other post-approval trials are intended not so much to support FDA 
approval of supplemental indications as to provide objective evidence for 
professional groups, hospitals and clinics, and individual physicians and 
patients when they are deciding how to use the approved drugs.  One 
manufacturer in particular, Pfizer, reported that as of 2003, its cholesterol 
drug Lipitor, first approved in 1998, had been tested in more than 400 
current or completed trials involving more than 80,000 patients.  Andrew 
Humphreys & Charles Boersig, Cholesterol drugs dominate: Lipitor and 
Zocor maintain their leading positions in the group of 200 best-selling 
prescription medicines., MED. AD. NEWS, May 1, 2003 at 1.  Major new trial 
results have since been presented on both heart attacks and strokes.  John C. 
LaRosa, et al., Treating to New Targets (TNT) Investigators, Intensive Lipid 
Lowering with Atorvastatin in Patients with Stable Coronary Disease, 352 
NEW ENG. J.MED 1425 (2005); David M. Kent, Editorial, Stroke: An Equal 
Opportunity for the Initiation of Statin Therapy, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 613 
(2006).  In the oncology field, extensive, and presumably expensive, post-
approval research on newer cancer drugs has explored the ability of   19 
approved drugs to treat relatively rare but deadly cancers, such as pancreatic 
cancer.  Peter Loftus, Hunt for Improved Pancreatic-Cancer Drug 
Continues, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2006, at D7 (discussing trial results for the 
cancer drug Erbitux for the treatment of pancreatic cancer). 
  All told, providing seriously-ill patients with access to Phase 1-
approved drugs will in no way undercut the tremendous economic incentives 
of manufacturers to fund and conduct critical, later stage testing on new 
drugs. 
CONCLUSION 
  Phase 1 approval by the FDA reflects the agency’s traditional 
approach to balancing the risks and benefits of new drugs, but Phase 1 data 
often reveal drugs that are of great potential value to patients who lack any 
alternative treatments.  The panel majority correctly refused to countenance 
the further administrative obstacles erected by the FDA, which result in long 
and unjustified Phase 2 delays in authorizing Phase 1-approved—and 
potentially life-saving—drugs.  These delays flow from the FDA’s bias for 
committing overcautious Type II errors.  The panel majority’s decision that 
Phase 1-approved drugs may not be withheld from terminally-ill patients 
will not interfere with the FDA approval process; to the contrary, patients 
will continue to participate in randomized clinical trials of available drugs,   20 
and manufacturers will continue to have incentives to mount randomized 
clinical trials of available drugs. 
  For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the original panel should be 
affirmed. 
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